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L ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT DOES NOT MISCHARACTERIZE THE RECORD OR 
EVIDENCE. 
In his Reply Brief, Respondent (hereinafter "Respondent" or "Amundson") 
asserts that Appellant has misstated the record, or has made arguments not supported by 
.evidence. More specifically, in footnote one of Respondent's Brief, Respondent states: 
In the Amended Complaint, Appellant asserts that tenant Roger 
Amundson, (hereinafter "Roger"), co-hosted the party on July 8, 2011. 
However, there is no evidence in the record to support this assertion, as it 
is undisputed in the record that Jon Sullivan hosted the party and 
personally invited the Respondent to attend the party in the early morning 
hours of July 8, 2011. See Respondent's Briefp. I footnote I. 
It should be noted that Appellant alleged that Roger co-hosted the party in 
his First Amended Complaint, prior to the discovery phase of this case, and 
pursuant to Idaho's notice pleading standard. This initial allegation was not made 
in any attempt to allege facts not in evidence. 
Next, in footnote two of Respondent's Brief, Respondent suggests that 
Appellant completely mischaracterized the record by stating: 
Appellant asserts there is "no dispute that Amundson has exercised 
complete authority and control over the property since purchase in 2007." 
This statement was made without citation and completely mischaracterizes 
the record, as it is undisputed that there were three tenants occupying the 
property pursuant to lease agreements at the time of Mr. Stiles' accident. 
See Respondent's Brief p. 2 footnote 2. 
Appellant supported the statement there 1s "no dispute that Amundson has 
exercised complete authority and control over the property since purchase in 2007" with 
Amundson's own deposition testimony. At deposition, Amundson testified that he 
maintained the property, performing all necessary maintenance and repairs, and 
occasionally supervising maintenance and repairs, if Roger or another tenant were willing 
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to assist with a task. Amundson testified that all decisions regarding maintenance or 
projects on the property were at his sole discretion and wholly for his benefit as owner of 
the property. (R. pp. 114, 124-125). See Appellant's Opening Briefp. 9. Amundson also 
testified that the acts ofremoving the window and placing it on the fence were all done at 
his direction. (R. p. 125). 
In his Opening Brief Respondent additionally suggested that Appellant 
mischaracterized the evidence by stating: 
Appellant states in his Opening Brief (p. 6.) that "the window was 
eventually placed against a cedar fence in the house's adjacent walkway." 
This Statement mischaracterizes the evidence to the extent it implies that 
Walter Amundson has any role in moving the window from the white 
picket fence next to the driveway to the cedar fence further back on the 
side of the property or that he knew that the window was located next to 
the cedar fence at the time of the alleged accident. The record reflects that 
Walter Amundson played no role in moving the window from the area of 
the driveway against the white picket fence and had no awareness that it 
had become broken or had been moved against the cedar fence prior to the 
accident. (R. pp. 48-49). The only facts in the record are that Roger 
moved the window himself. See Respondent's Brief p. 3 footnote 3. 
It is undisputed, and supported by substantial deposition testimony, that the window was 
eventually placed against a cedar fence in the house's adjacent walkway. (R. pp. 142, 
143, 233). Additionally, roommate Wayne Jenkins ("Jenkins") initially testified at 
deposition that Walter and his Son moved the window from its initial position, fmiher up 
the walkway. (R. p. 233). Jenkins later recanted this statement, and testified that "I don't 
know if Walter had, but all I know is that Roger moved it." (R. p. 233). This conflicting 
testimony raises a question of fact regarding whether Amundson assisted in moving the 
window. Amundson additionally testified at deposition he was at the property to collect 
rent from his tenants immediately prior to the accident, either on July 5 or 6, 2011, which 
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was only two or three days prior to the date of the accident. Amundson was able to 
initially recall this visit, since Sullivan was usually paid on the fifth day of each month. 
(R. p. 118). 
Amundson and Roger also testified to the size and weight of the window. 
Amundson testified that the window was eight foot long, four foot high, and "when 
you're lifting 200 pounds you want to set it down as soon as possible." (R. p. 119). At 
deposition Roger initially testified that the window weighed a good five hundred pounds, 
and at least five hundred pounds. (R. p. 141 ). Roger then testified that the window 
maybe did not weigh that much, maybe like 250, maybe 300, but it was heavy. (R. p. 
141 ). Roger also testified that he dragged the window about 20 feet. (R. 140). 
Provided the foregoing facts, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding 
whether Amundson knew, or should have known, the window was moved up the alley, 
and whether Amundson may have assisted in moving the window, and whether such a 
large object could have been moved by Roger alone. 
On appeal, Respondent has again relied upon his own, self-serving, affidavit to 
support his factual assertions, ignoring the testimony elicited at a number of depositions 
during the discovery phase of this case. 1 Regardless of Respondent's assertions 
Appellant has neither mischaracterized the record, nor the evidence. 
1 In its Summary Judgment briefing, Respondent relied almost exclusively on his own 
self-serving affidavit, ignoring salient facts elicited at deposition. On appeal, Respondent 
again attempts to minimize the extensive deposition testimony taken in this case. 
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B. THIS COURT SHOULD FOLLOW OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND THE 
STANDARD SET FORTH BY THIS COURT IN STEPHENS AND APPLY 
THE STANDARD OF ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE TO 
RESPONDENT. 
In his Response, Respondent states that the appellant: 
Seeks to either eliminate the distinctions between invitees and licensees 
altogether, or expand the duties of a landlord such that all entrants on a 
rental property should be classified as licensees, and by doing so, the 
Appellant asks this Court to ignore established precedent and the logical 
and sound public policy reasons why Idaho appellate courts have declined 
to expand a landlord's premises liability duties to a social guest (licensee) 
of tenant. See Respondent 's Brief p. 9. 
What Appellant seeks, as argued in his Opening Brie( is for this Court to apply 
the tried and true negligence standard to landlords, and employ the modern approach to 
duty establishing "a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the 
circumstances." Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258 267 P.2d 41, 50 (1984). This 
is a good faith argument, supported by this Court's decision in Stephens, decisions from 
other jurisdictions, and sound public policy reasons. Decisions from other jurisdictions 
supporting the application of the foregoing standard, and a detailed analysis of this 
Court's decision in Stephens were provided in depth in Appellant's Opening Brief, and 
will not be repeated here. However, as recognized by other jurisdictions, and relied upon 
by this Court in Stephens decision, the public policy considerations supporting the 
adoption of this standard are considerable. This Court held, "while continuing to pay lip 
service to the general rule, the courts have expended considerable energy and exercised 
great ingenuity in attempting to fit various settings into the recognized exceptions." Id. at 
258. Thus, employing the negligence standard, and adopting duty of "reasonable care in 
light of all the circumstances" promotes judicial economy. 
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Other jurisdictions have found that "the better public policy lies in the 
abandonment of the general rule of nonliability, and further questions of control, hidden 
defects, and common use would be relevant only as bearing on the general determination 
of negligence, including foreseeability and unreasonableness of the risk of harm." 
Pagelsdmf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 284 N.W. 2d 55 (Wis. 1979). Hence, other 
jurisdictions have found it better to employ the negligence analysis, rather than the 
outdated, common-law approach promoting non-liability. The negligence analysis does 
not increase liability for landowners, it simply subjects landowners to the traditional and 
trusted method of determining negligence, which includes foreseeability, and 
unreasonableness of the risk of harm. 
Finally, the practical result of failing to hold landlords to a reasonable duty of care 
1s that landlords are discouraged to perform repairs of rented premises. Young v. 
Garwicki, 380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E. 2d 1045 (1980). There is no sound public policy 
behind encouraging landlords not to maintain and upkeep a rented or leased premises. 
Again, Appellant respectfully submits that the duty owed by Amundson does not 
depend on Stiles' status on the property. In this factual scenario, Idaho law does not 
recognize a difference in the duty owed by a landlord to licensees and invitees. The duty 
owed by landlords to invitees and licensees alike should be to use due care to prevent 
unreasonable and foreseeable risks of harm to both classes of persons. As Appellant has 
argued previously, the proper standard of care is one of ordinary and reasonable care in 
light of all the circumstances. 
Despite Respondent's assertions to the contrary, as established by this Court in 
Stephens, and as established in a number of other jurisdictions, in modem society, there is 
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no justification to provide landlords the archaic common-law cloak of immunity. A 
landowner's duty to tenants and social guests alike is, and should be, one of reasonable 
care under the circumstances toward all who come onto the property. 
C. THERE ARE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASES TO FIND RESPONDENT 
SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT REPAIR. 
The standard regarding a landlord's duty to a social guest, as stated by the Court 
of Appeals in Robinson v. Mueller is that "the landlord owes a duty to the extent that, if 
the landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs on the premises, the landlord must exercise 
reasonable care in performing such repairs." Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 23 7, 241 
322 P.3d 319 (Ct. App. 2014). Contrary to Respondent's assertions, there was a repair 
performed by Amundson on the property. Amundson directed a project to remove a large 
bay window from the property's garage. (R. pp. 117, 119). When the window was 
removed, there was a large hole remaining, which had to be remodeled, and repaired in 
order to accommodate a garage door. Once the window was removed, one witness 
referred to the area formerly containing the window as " the aftermath." (R. p. 189). 
Once the window was removed, there is no doubt extensive repair work was done to 
eventually frame in the garage door. 
Part of the removal and repair project was the storage of the window. The record 
supports the fact that Amundson spearheaded the removal and repair project. As a 
landowner he assumed the duty of reasonable care in performing such repair. As stated 
in Appellant's Opening Brief, and further above, the window was very large, heavy, and 
consisted of a number of glass panes. It is a question of fact whether Amundson met his 
duty of reasonable care to Appellant when he initially stored the window in the walkway, 
and when Amundson failed to follow up on the status and condition of the window on the 
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premises that he owned and controlled, once the window had been shattered, and moved 
to a different location, where it was known residents and guests could possibly travel at 
night. 
Respondent additionally concludes that the hazard at issue in this case is not the 
broken window. (R. p. 25). Respondent suggests "the hazard at issue in this case is the 
tree stump, not the broken window, and even without the presence of the broken window, 
the Appellant would have tripped and injured himself." See Respondent's Brief, p. 25. 
Appellant certainly could have tripped over a stump and injured himself. It is however 
doubtful that Appellant could have suffered such severe injuries without the presence of a 
sharp instrumentality, such as a shattered windowpane. At least one witness thought the 
window was the hazard at issue. Roger testified that after Mr. Stiles was injured he broke 
the rest of the glass out of the broken pane since it was a hazard, and he eliminated the 
hazard so nobody else would hurt themselves. (R. p. 141 ). Roger went on to testify that 
"he should have destroyed the window after Wayne broke the panel because none of this 
would have occurred, and there wouldn't have been this hazard." (R. p. 145). 
Based on the foregoing, there are plausible legal and factual arguments that 
Amundson's negligent repair was the cause of Appellant's injuries, and the shattered 
window presented a definite hazard. Genuine issues of material fact exist surrounding 
whether Amundson' s repair was negligent, and a breach of his duty of ordinary and 
reasonable care to Appellant. These are questions that should be submitted to a jury. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 9 
11. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and the arguments set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, 
this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court in granting summary 
judgment. Accordingly, the case sub Judice should be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
,-L 
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